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Abstract
The star-discrepancy is a quantitative measure for the irregularity of distribution
of a point set in the unit cube that is intimately linked to the integration error of
quasi-Monte Carlo algorithms. These popular integration rules are nowadays also
applied to very high-dimensional integration problems. Hence multi-dimensional
point sets of reasonable size with low discrepancy are badly needed. A seminal
result from Heinrich, Novak, Wasilkowski and Woz´niakowski shows the existence
of a positive number C such that for every dimension d there exists an N -element
point set in [0, 1)d with star-discrepancy of at most C
√
d/N . This is a pure existence
result and explicit constructions of such point sets would be very desirable. The
proofs are based on random samples of N -element point sets which are difficult to
realize for practical applications.
In this paper we propose to use secure pseudorandom bit generators for the
generation of point sets with star-discrepancy of order O(
√
d/N). This proposal is
supported theoretically and by means of numerical experiments.
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1 Introduction
Let d,N ∈ N. For an N -element point set P = {x1, . . . ,xN} in the d-dimensional unit-
cube [0, 1)d the star-discrepancy is defined as
D∗N(P) = sup
t∈[0,1]d
∣∣∣∣#{k ∈ {1, . . . , N} : xk ∈ [0, t)}N − volume([0, t))
∣∣∣∣ ,
where, for t = (t1, . . . , td) ∈ [0, 1]d, [0, t) = [0, t1) × . . . × [0, td). The star-discrepancy is
a quantitative measure for the irregularity of distribution which is closely related to the
integration error of quasi-Monte Carlo (QMC) rules via the well-known Koksma-Hlawka
inequality (see [6, 16, 18, 20]).
Classically, the star-discrepancy is studied in an asymptotic setting for a fixed dimen-
sion d when N tends to infinity. The best results in this context are point sets with
star-discrepancy of order of magnitude O((logN)d−1/N). Often it is conjectured, that
this order of magnitude is the best what one can achieve in dimension d. This is a still
open question but it must be confessed that there are also other opinions (c.f. [5]).
However, in practical applications of QMC methods the dimension d can be very
large and in this regime an error bound of order O((logN)d−1/N) is useless for point
sets of manageable size N . Consider, for example, a point set with N = 2d elements,
which is already very large when d ≥ 25 (in applications dimension d might be in the
hundreds or thousands). Then, (logN)d−1/N ≈ dd−1/2d which demonstrates how useless
the asymptotic excellent discrepancy bounds are for practical problems. Larcher [17] was
the first to create doubts whether a star-discrepancy bound of asymptotically excellent
order can help for practical applications.
From late 1990s this problem has attracted a lot interest, see for example the surveys
in [21, Section 3.1.5] and [22, Section 9.9] and the references therein. It is now known
that there exists some C > 0 such that for every N and d there exists an N -element point
set P in [0, 1)d whose star-discrepancy satisfies
D∗N(P) ≤ C
√
d
N
. (1)
This is a famous result by Heinrich, Novak, Wasilkowski and Woz´niakowski [14]. Aistleit-
ner [1] proved that C can be chosen to be 10 and very recently, Gnewuch and Hebbing-
haus [11] reduced C further to the value 2.5287. . . The proofs of these results are based
on the fact that the expected star-discrepancy of a randomly generated point set satisfies
the inequality in (1). However, as Aistleitner and Hofer pointed out in [2], such a mere
existence result is not of much use for applications. Furthermore, they proved a ver-
sion of (1) which provides estimates for the probability of a random point set to satisfy
it. Their results demonstrate that the probability q, that a random point set satisfies a
star-discrepancy bound of the form c(q, d)
√
d/N , is extremely large already for moderate
values of c(q, d) (see the forthcoming Lemma 2).
A straightforward approach is to simply choose a random sample of N uniformly
i.i.d. points in [0, 1)d and then one can assume, with very large probability, that the
star-discrepancy of this sample is sufficiently small. This has not being met with general
acceptance due to two main shortcomings:
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• First, the computation of the star-discrepancy of a given multi-dimensional point
set is very difficult (see, e.g., [12]). So even for moderate values of d it is almost
impossible the check whether the obtained random sample is really of low star-
discrepancy.
• The next problem, which we address in the present work, is how to efficiently gen-
erate random samples on a computer from uniformly i.i.d. random variables in
[0, 1)d.
Pseudorandom number generators are any kind of algorithms that generate a sequence
of numbers with similar properties to random sequences of numbers. Special classes of
pseudorandom number sequences have been proved to be of low star-discrepancy using the
Erdo¨s-Turan inequality. Even that this approach is useful for certain applications, i.e to
prove normality of specific real numbers (see [3]), the obtained discrepancy bounds depend
exponentially on the dimension. Our approach is to replace random samples by point
sets obtained from secure pseudorandom bit generators. The employed pseudorandom
bit generator requires as input a finite string of bits called seed, then the sequence of
pseudorandom bits is transformed in a natural way to a point set in the unit-cube [0, 1)d
with prescribed p bits of precision. Under the assumption of uniformly chosen seed we
show that the obtained point sets satisfy the desired discrepancy bound of order
√
d/N
with high probability. Our proposed method is supported by numerical results up to
dimension d = 15. These results also support a conjecture by Novak and Woz´iakowski [22,
p. 68].
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we provide the necessary material
related to secure pseudorandom bit generators and the construction of the point sets.
Section 3 is devoted to the theoretical result which guarantees for reasonable values of
d and N that the proposed point sets have discrepancy of order
√
d/N with high prob-
ability when the seed is i.i.d. uniformly distributed. In Section 4 we present numerical
results which support the proposed use of secure pseudorandom bit generators for the
construction of point sets with low star-discrepancy.
2 Secure pseudorandom bit generators and point sets
in the unit cube
This section provides the basic notation that we will employ through the paper. A binary
word is a string of bits, i.e. of zeros and ones. The set with binary words of length n is
denoted by {0, 1}n. A uniformly distributed random variable on {0, 1}n is denoted by Un.
We remark that the index n always refers to the length of the binary words.
Definition 1. Let m,n ∈ N, where usually n is much smaller than m. A pseudorandom
bit generator is a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m, which can be evaluated in polynomial
time. The seed or input of a pseudorandom bit generator is a binary word of length
n. It is assumed that the seed is based on true random information. The output is a
pseudorandom bit sequence of length m.
To define a secure pseudorandom bit generator, we use the notion of a (T, ε)-distinguisher
(see [10]).
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Definition 2. Let T ∈ N and ε > 0. A (T, ε)-distinguisher for a pseudorandom bit
generator f is any probabilistic algorithm D whose input are binary words of length m
and which returns, after at most T time units, a value of 0 or 1 such that
|P[D(f(Un)) = 1]− P[D(Um) = 1]| ≥ ε.
Then, a pseudorandom number generator f is said to be (T, ε)-indistinguishable if no
(T, ε)-distinguisher exists for f .
A pseudorandom number generator f is said to have b bits of security if every (T, ε)-
distinguisher for f satisfies
T > 2bε2;
see [19] for further reading. Equivalently, for a pseudorandom number generator f with b
bits of security, any probabilistic algorithm D with run time of at most T time units that
returns a value of 0 or 1 for any input sequence from {0, 1}m, we have
|P[D(f(Un)) = 1]− P[D(Um) = 1]| <
√
T
2b
. (2)
To initialize a pseudorandom bit generator a seed of n bits must be provided that
supports the security strength b requested by the implementation of the generator mecha-
nism. For example, a Hash-pseudorandom bit generator based on SHA-512 has parameters
n = 888 for b = 256, see [4, p. 38, Table 2]. Constructions of pseudorandom number gen-
erators that achieve at least b bits security are known for any b (see, e.g., [13]) but only
the cases b ∈ {112, 128, 192, 256} are standardized (see, e.g., [4]). We note that this holds
for any practical value of m.
Transforming binary words to point sets in the unit cube. To convert a binary
word of length m to a N -element point set in [0, 1)d we use the following binary interchange
format: For a given precision p ∈ N, take the p trailing significant field string represented
by a binary word d1, d2, . . . , dp, then
p∑
i=1
di
2i
is a coordinate of an element of the point set P . For p = 52, this representation follows
the double-precision floating-point format binary64, see [15].
For a given binary word Um we denote the resulting point set by P(Um), in this case
we will require m = pdN bits to construct N points in [0, 1)d.
3 Theoretical results on star-discrepancy for pseudo-
random point sets
We consider a particular distinguisher D which takes a binary word Um of length m,
generates a sequence of points P = P(Um) = {X1, . . . , XN} in the d dimensional unit
cube [0, 1)d as described above and calculates the star-discrepancy of P . The distinguisher
returns 1 if the star-discrepancy is greater than C
√
d/N , where C is a suitably chosen
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constant. The star-discrepancy of an N -element point set in [0, 1)d can be calculated in
O(N1+d/2) operations (see [7, 9, 12]).
In order to generate the binary words Um we use a pseudorandom bit generator
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
with b bits of security, which will be explicitly selected later. We note that n is much
smaller than m = pdN , in our applications p = 52, i.e., m = 52dN .
Theorem 1. Let n, p, d,N ∈ N and let m = pdN . Assume that f(Un) is obtained from
a pseudorandom bit generator f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m with b bits of security. Let P(f(Un))
be the corresponding N-element point set in [0, 1)d with random seed Un. Then we have
P
[
D∗N(P(f(Un))) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
≤ exp
4.9− 1
5.72
(
C −
√
dN
2p
)2+ O(√N1+d/2
2b
)
.
For a choice of values of bit security b = 256 and precision p = 52, the bound on
the probability in Theorem 1 is very small for reasonable values of d and N whenever
C >
√
4.9 · 5.7 = 12.6174 . . ..
For the proof of Theorem 1 we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Let X1, . . . , XN be uniformly i.i.d. in [0, 1)
d with Xj = (Xj,1, . . . , Xj,d) for
j ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For p ∈ N and i ∈ {1, . . . , d} let
X
(p)
j,i :=
b2pXj,ic
2p
∈
{
0,
1
2p
, . . . ,
2p − 1
2p
}
and X
(p)
j = (X
(p)
j,1 , . . . , X
(p)
j,d ).
Consider the binary expansion of X
(p)
j,i and concatenate the corresponding dN binary words
to obtain a binary word Um of length m = pdN . Then
1. P(Um) = {X(p)1 , . . . , X(p)N };
2. Um is uniformly distributed in {0, 1}m;
3. the star-discrepancies of P = {X1, . . . , XN} and P(Um) differ at most by d/2p, i.e.,
|D∗N(P)−D∗N(P(Um))| ≤
d
2p
; (3)
4. for C > 0 we have
P
[
D∗N(P(Um)) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
≤ P
[
D∗N(P) ≥ C
√
d
N
− d
2p
]
. (4)
Proof. Items 1. and 2. are obviously true. In order to prove 3. note first that for every
j ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have
‖Xj −X(p)j ‖∞ ≤
1
2p
,
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where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the `∞-norm in Rd. Therefore (3) follows from [6, Proposition 3.15].
Finally we show 4. For C > 0 we obtain from (3) that
D∗N(P(Um)) ≥ C
√
d
N
⇒ D∗N(P) ≥ C
√
d
N
− d
2p
and hence we obtain (4).
The following result is [2, Corollary 1].
Lemma 2 (Aistleitner and Hofer). For any d,N ∈ N and q ∈ (0, 1) a randomly generated
d-dimensional point set P in [0, 1)d satisfies
D∗N(P) ≤ 5.7
√
4.9 + log((1− q)−1)
√
d
N
with probability at least q.
Now we can state the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let P be a set of uniformly i.i.d. points in [0, 1)d and let P(Um) be
constructed as in the statement of Lemma 1. Then we have
P
[
D∗N(P(f(Un))) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
≤ P
[
D∗N(P(Um)) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
+
∣∣∣∣∣P
[
D∗N(P(f(Un))) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
− P
[
D∗N(P(Um)) ≥ C
√
d
N
]∣∣∣∣∣ .
The first term can be bounded using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. In particular, choosing
q such that
5.7
√
4.9 + log((1− q)−1)
√
d
N
= C
√
d
N
− d
2p
we get
P
[
D∗N(P(Um)) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
≤ e4.9− 15.72
(
C−
√
dN
2p
)2
. (5)
The second term can be bounded using Eq. (2) and the fact that the star-discrepancy
can be calculated in O(N1+d/2) operations (see [7, 9]). This way we obtain∣∣∣∣∣P
[
D∗N(P(f(Un))) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
− P
[
D∗N(P(Um)) ≥ C
√
d
N
]∣∣∣∣∣ < O
(√
N1+d/2
2b
)
.
Together we obtain
P
[
D∗N(P(f(Un))) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
≤ e4.9− 15.72
(
C−
√
dN
2p
)2
+ O
(√
N1+d/2
2b
)
.
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Denoting ld the binary logarithm and choosing b =
⌈
2 ldC + d
2
ldN
⌉
in Theorem 1
we obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 1. With the notation from Theorem 1 and with b =
⌈
2 ldC + d
2
ldN
⌉
we obtain
P
[
D∗N(P(f(Un))) ≥ C
√
d
N
]
≤ O
(
1
C2
)
.
4 Numerical experiments
In order to support our approach, we have performed several numerical experiments dur-
ing 83 days in one node (332.8 GFLOPS) of Altamira, the High Performance Computer
cluster at the University of Cantabria. Altamira belongs to RES (Red Espan˜ola de Su-
percomputacio´n) network.
We generated a file with 40.000 hexadecimal digits with the library Openssl [23], using
the default AES-256 CTR DRBG with security bit strength b = 256. In this configuration,
the required seed length is n = 384 bits in which at least 256 bits are supposed to be
random and independent. The implementation employs entropy sources available to the
computer (keystrokes, mouse movements, internal clock,...).
These hexadecimal bits are transformed in floating point numbers of precision p =
52 and then, depending of the dimension, grouped in d-dimensional vectors following
the steps described in Section 2. Finally the star-discrepancy is computed using the
implementation of the algorithm by Dobkin, Eppstein and Mitchell [7] provided by Magnus
Wahlstro¨m [24].
The results for dimensions d ∈ {13, 14, 15} are displayed in Figures 1–3. The real
values plotted in blue are compared with the graph of the bound
√
d/N plotted in red.
We are also interested in the inverse of star-discrepancy, which is for given ε ∈ (0, 1)
and dimension d the smallest size N of a point set in [0, 1)d with star-discrepancy at most
ε, i.e.,
N(ε, d) = min{N ∈ N : ∃P ⊆ [0, 1)d such that |P| = N and D∗N(P) ≤ ε}.
Note that (1) implies that
N(ε, d) ≤ C2dε−2.
This means in the language of IBC (information based complexity) that the star-discrepancy
is polynomially tractable.
Results on N(ε, d) based on the proposed construction in this paper for d ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 15}
and ε ∈ {0.5, 0.333, 0.25, 0.125} are displayed in Table 1. Based on results in [8] for d < 10
it is conjectured by Novak and Woz´niakowski in [22, p. 68] that N = 10d points in [0, 1)d
suffice in order to achieve a star-discrepancy of at most 0.25. Our values N(0.25, d) from
Table 1 are in this conjectured regime.
Finally, in Figure 4 we visualize two point sets in the two-dimensional cube. The one
on the left hand side consists of 11 points and has star-discrepancy not larger that 0.25.
The point set on the right hand side consists of 242 points and has star-discrepancy not
larger than 0.1.
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Figure 1: Discrepancy of N points in [0, 1)13
d 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 ε
N(ε, d) 10 13 10 25 26 24 28 31 14 30 32 33 38 50 0.5
N(ε, d) 10 45 36 55 60 52 62 61 47 70 75 62 83 - 0.333
N(ε, d) 11 87 78 93 82 76 96 94 76 108 120 - - - 0.25
N(ε, d) 215 195 194 232 214 325 304 - - - - - - - 0.125
Table 1: Dimension d versus N(ε, d), the number of points necessary to reach a discrepancy
of at most ε, for ε ∈ {0.125, 0.25, 0.333, 0.5}
5 Conclusions
In this work, we employed secure pseudorandom bit generators for the generation of point
sets in [0, 1)d of reasonable size with low star-discrepancy. The expected probability of
obtaining point sets with star-discrepancy of order C
√
d/N for specific parameters were
given in Theorem 1. Previous theoretical results were pessimistic with respect to the value
of the constant C whereas our numerical results suggest that the practical values are closer
to 1. We hope that this study provides new insight into the problem of generating low
discrepancy multidimensional point sets.
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